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Weighing public interest against personal liberty 
interests, the risk to officer safety 
outweighs the minimal intrusion of 
asking a passenger of a lawfully 
stopped vehicle to step outside of 
that vehicle. This was the holding 
in the recent decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Maryland 
v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997). 
The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution guaran-
tees freedom from "unreasonable" 
seizures. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court 
held that an officer may stop and 
frisk a person for weapons, as long 
as that officer could articulate 
some reasonable suspicion of 
possible danger. In Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), 
the Court determined that asking a 
driver of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle to exit that vehicle, even 
with no articulable suspicion of 
danger, was not an unreasonable 
seizure. In Wilson, the Court was 
asked to consider whether extend-
ing Mimms to include the pas-
senger of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle constituted an unrea-
sonable seizure. 
In June 1994, a Maryland State 
Trooper stopped a vehicle with 
two passengers whose behavior 
was unusually nervous and furtive. 
Although the driver exited the 
vehicle and approached the trooper 
without being asked to do so, the 
trooper also asked the passenger in 
the front seat of the vehicle, Jerry 
Lee Wilson ("Wilson"), to exit. 
As he was exiting the vehicle, 
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Wilson dropped what the trooper 
suspected was crack cocaine. 
Wilson was arrested and charged 
with possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance with the 
intent to distribute. 
At trial, the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County granted 
Wilson's motion to suppress the 
cocaine as the fruit of an unrea-
sonable seizure, violative of his 
Fourth Amendment rights. The 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed, adding that 
Mimms would not be extended to 
apply to passengers. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland denied 
certiorari. 
Wilson's victory, however, 
was short-lived. On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, the 
Court found persuasive the officer 
safety arguments of the govern-
ment, reversed the decision of the 
court of special appeals, and 
remanded the case for retrial. 
In a four-page opinion, the 
Court adopted as precedent what it 
had previously hinted at in dicta. 
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885 (citing 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
Recent Developments 
(1978)). The Fourth Amendment 
guarantee against unreasonable 
seizure does not apply to passen-
gers of vehicles once a proper stop 
has been made. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 
at 885. The Court applied its long-
standing analysis of the rea-
sonableness of a seizure by balanc-
ing public interest against an 
individual's right to freedom from 
arbitrary interference by the 
government. Id. In the case of a 
lawful traffic stop, officer safety is 
given great deference. Id. The 
risk to officer safety is increased 
when there are passengers in 
addition to a driver in a stopped 
vehicle. Likewise, any violent 
reaction from a driver of a stopped 
vehicle, aimed at preventing the 
discovery of evidence of some 
other crime, is similarly motivated 
from a passenger of that vehicle. 
Id. By ordering passengers to exit 
a vehicle, law enforcement officers 
deny the passengers access to 
concealed weapons. Id. The risk 
inherent in vehicle stops, therefore, 
outweighs the minimal intrusion of 
asking a passenger in a vehicle that 
is already stopped to move to the 
outside of that vehicle. Id. 
Dissenting from the majority, 
Justices Stevens and Kennedy 
expressed concern that Wilson 
gives the government carte blanche 
authority. Officers are now em-
powered to command drivers and 
passengers from their vehicles 
without "even a scintilla of 
evidence of any potential risk to 
the police officer." Id. at 887. 
Thus, according to the dissent, 
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dispensing with the element of 
probable cause, or even some 
objective standard, is too heavy an 
imposition on the innocent citizens 
involved in the large number of 
routine stops that occur each day. 
Id. 
The number of stops where an 
officer is ever at risk is, in fact, far 
overshadowed by the actual num-
ber of routine stops. Id. at 888. 
While the imposition on pas-
sengers ordered to exit their 
vehicles may be insignificant, the 
aggregate effect of passengers who 
are unnecessarily offended, embar-
rassed, and exposed to inclement 
weather is great. Id. 
While the hypotheticals posed 
by both the majority and dissent 
are compelling, it might be argued 
that the Court seized the oppor-
tunity, via Wilson, to tip the scales 
in favor of public interest. The 
Court seemed to disregard the fact 
that the trooper who asked Wilson 
to exit the vehicle did articulate an 
objective suspicion for making that 
request. Instead, the Court chose 
to rely on policy in rendering its 
decision. In effect, the Court 
determined that police officers 
may be relied upon to use their 
knowledge, experience, and train-
ing to protect themselves and the 
general public. 
Editor's Note: Professor Byron L. 
Warnken argued the respondent's 
case before the United States 
Supreme Court against United 
States Attorney General Janet 
Reno and Maryland Attorney 
General J. Joseph Curran, Jr. 
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